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I estimate the aggregate income elasticity of Wal-Mart’s and Target’s revenues
using quarterly data for 1997–2006. I ﬁnd that Wal-Mart’s revenues increase
during bad times, whereas Target’s revenues decrease, consistent with Wal-Mart
selling “inferior goods” in the technical sense of the term. An upper bound on
the aggregate income elasticity of demand for Wal-Mart’s wares is −0.5.
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“I feel we are well positioned for an economic downturn. Our low prices and
low-cost business model should give us an advantage over other retailers if things
get more diﬃcult for consumers.”
— Wal-Mart’s CEO Lee Scott, quoted by CNNMoney, October 2007
1 Introduction
In this paper, I test for the aggregate-income elasticity of revenues at Wal-Mart and Target
using panel data for 1997-2006. I ﬁnd that Wal-Mart’s revenues fall during good times
whereas Target’s rise during good times. Inferring income elasticities of demand from these
estimated income elasticities of revenue, consumers view purchases at Wal-Mart as inferior
goods whereas purchases at Target are normal goods.
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and Peter Mueser for helpful conversations. All errors are my own.A well-established cross-sectional fact is that Wal-Mart’s shoppers have relatively low
incomes compared to, say, Target’s shoppers.1 In a 2005 survey by the Pew Research Center
for the People and the Press, 53 percent of respondents reporting annual earnings below
$20,000 said they shopped at Wal-Mart “regularly,” compared with 33 percent of respondents
earning more than $50,000 (Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, 2005). The
average annual household income among Wal-Mart shoppers is $40,000-45,000, roughly equal
to the U.S. median household income, compared with $60,000 for Target shoppers (Mui,
2005). Conﬁrming this pattern, Figure A plots the frequency of shopping at Wal-Mart (and
Target) — “often,” “sometimes,” or “never,” based on survey evidence — for households
with incomes below $40,000 and above $70,000.2 Shopping frequencies at Wal-Mart are
higher for all income groups because the chain’s penetration is higher, but the likelihood of
shopping at Wal-Mart “often” falls with income whereas the likelihood of shopping at Target
“often” rises with income.
This cross-sectional evidence does not establish that a given household will increase its
shopping at Target and decrease its shopping at Wal-Mart as its income rose. If Wal-Mart
stores are located in lower-income areas, for example, shopping at Wal-Mart may be a normal
activity and still consistent with the cross-sectional evidence. Despite this distinction, the
claim has been made that Wal-Mart sells inferior goods in the technical sense of the term —
goods for which demand increases when income falls. The goal of this paper is to evaluate
the “inferiority” of Wal-Mart’s goods using appropriate data and methods.
I use aggregate data on personal disposable income as a measure of consumer income
and publicly-available data on sales per store at both Wal-Mart and Target. By construction,
the aggregate elasticity I estimate is a weighted average of individual households’ elasticities
of expenditure and can be interpreted as the “average” household’s income elasticity of
1Target’s “upscale discounter” brand positioning and its tendency to locate in higher-income markets
(Rowley, 2003; Zhu, Singh, and Manuszak, 2005) have contributed to this diﬀerence.
2See Basker, Gil, and Kendall (2008) for details about the data.
2expenditure on Wal-Mart’s and Target’s wares. This elasticity of expenditure is an upper
bound on the elasticity of demand at Wal-Mart if Wal-Mart’s prices are not any more elastic
with respect to income than other stores’ prices. Evidence presented in the Appendix to this
paper suggests Wal-Mart’s prices are, if anything, less elastic with respect to income than
prices at other stores, which implies that the income elasticity of expenditure for Wal-Mart’s
goods is even more negative than my estimates suggest.
Holding relative prices constant, two eﬀects of income on store revenues work in opposite
directions. On the one hand, a negative income shock may send some shoppers who normally
shop at more upscale retailers to discounters, thus increasing revenue at the discount retailers.
On the other hand, people who already shop at discounters curtail their spending as well.
The aggregate eﬀect depends both on the proportion of households of the two types and on
the income elasticity of demand for each group. If the income shocks are not uniform across
types, the relative size of the income shock matters, too.
Ideally, this question would be addressed using household panel data in which house-
hold’s time-invariant characteristics as well as shoppers’ choice sets are controlled for and
changes in income are matched with changes in purchasing patterns. Unfortunately, I am
not aware of a panel large enough for such analysis; since household income is highly auto-
correlated, a long panel would be necessary to capture the eﬀect of changes in income.
I estimate the aggregate income elasticity of revenue at Wal-Mart to be negative, with
an upper bound around −0.5. This implies that ceteris paribus, a 1% decrease in personal
disposable income increases Wal-Mart’s revenues by 0.5%, either because there are more
households that view shopping at Wal-Mart as an inferior activity or because those house-
holds that view it as inferior have a larger (absolute) elasticity of demand than households
that view it as normal. The income elasticity of demand is, if anything, larger in abso-
lute terms (more negative); the same upper bound applies but a realistic (still conservative)
value is −0.7. By contrast, shopping at Target is a normal activity with an aggregate income
elasticity between 0.8 and 0.9.
32 Data
I combine data from Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and Target Corporation with data on personal
disposal income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.3
For Wal-Mart, I obtained Annual Reports, 10-Q and 10-K ﬁlings with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to calculate Wal-Mart’s store count and quarterly revenue from
1997 to the present. Because Wal-Mart Stores operates in two other market segments —
Sam’s Clubs, which cater primarily to small-business owners, and the international market,
which follows diﬀerent cyclical and seasonal patterns — I relied on the quarterly reports to
parse out the Wal-Mart segment’s store count and revenue. Quarterly data prior to 1997
do not distinguish between Wal-Mart and the other segments. (The Wal-Mart segment’s
revenues as a fraction of all revenues range between 63–72% over this period.) Within the
Wal-Mart segment, the retailer operates three store types: Discount Stores, Supercenters,
and Neighborhood Markets.
Target Corporation currently operates only Target stores, having sold its two other
segments, Mervyn’s and Marshall Field’s department stores, in 2004. Prior to mid-2004 I
obtain Target stores’ share of revenue and store count from the company’s 10-Q ﬁlings and
Annual Reports. I was able to obtain data for Target back to 1994, but I use only the
1997–2006 sample for comparability with Wal-Mart.
Both ﬁrms’ ﬁscal years start at the beginning of February (Wal-Mart’s ﬁscal year starts
on February 1 each year; Target’s ﬁscal year starts on the Sunday following the Saturday
nearest to January 31). I use the average CPI for all items from the Bureau of Labor Statistics
over the three months constituting each quarter to deﬂate the ﬁrms’ revenue ﬁgures.
By the mid-1990s, each of these two chains operated more than 1,000 stores in the seg-
3Kmart, the third major discount retailer and a natural candidate to be included in this analysis is
excluded because it underwent two major structural changes during this period resulting in inconsistent
ﬁnancial data over time. After emerging from Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in the early 00s, in November
2005 Kmart Holding Corporation merged with Sears to become Sears Holding Corporation.
4ment of interest and had a presence in most states. I use quarterly estimates of aggregate
personal disposable income from the Bureau of Economic Analysis as my measure of con-
sumer income for the quarter, and divide by annual estimates of the U.S. population from
the Census Bureau to obtain a measure of per-capita disposable income.4
The quarterly data from the BEA is oﬀ by one month from the quarterly data for the
ﬁrms. For example, the ﬁrst quarter in the BEA data runs January-March whereas the ﬁrst
quarter of the ﬁrms’ ﬁscal years is February-April. This seems appropriate, given the fact
that past income largely fuels current spending, but I also construct an adjusted measure of
disposable income using a weighted average of disposable income in the current quarter and
the next quarter.
3 Implementation and Results
I index retailers (Wal-Mart and Target) by i and quarters by t. The main speciﬁcation is:




γs · Seasonst + δ · Trendt + φ · Trendt · Wal-Marti + εit (1)
where StoreRevenue is real revenue per store in quarter t; Income is real disposable
income per capita in quarter t; Wal-Mart is a dummy for Wal-Mart; Season are a set of
quarter (season) dummies, with the ﬁrst quarter excluded; Trend is a linear time trend; and
ε is the error term which is assumed to be normal, and is adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
4State-level estimates of personal income are also available. In the case of Wal-Mart, I could use supple-
mentary information on the number of stores in each state at the end of each quarter to construct a weighted
average of state-level per-capita personal income, but I do not have comparable data for Target. In addition,
this measure is not qualitatively diﬀerent from the national ﬁgures since the chain was already operating in
most, and then all, states by the sample period. Finally, state-level estimates are only available for personal
income, not for personal disposable income, which is arguably the better measure of income for this analysis.
5The coeﬃcient δ captures the common trend in sales per store across the two ﬁrms, while,
φ, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term, captures any diﬀerential trend for Wal-Mart.
The coeﬃcient β on log disposable income is intended to capture the cyclicality of
revenues common to Wal-Mart and Target; if β is positive, then consumers view Target’s
products as normal goods, and if β is negative, the goods are viewed as inferior. The coef-
ﬁcient θ captures the diﬀerential eﬀect of log disposable income on Wal-Mart’s revenue; a
positive estimate of θ would indicate that Wal-Mart’s products are “more normal” than Tar-
get’s, and a negative coeﬃcient would indicate that they are “less normal” (more inferior).
The interpretation of β is subject to the objection that purchases in general merchandise are
often durable, at least for a few quarters: clothing, electronics, toys, and housewares are ob-
vious examples. These purchases may be procyclical simply because of liquidity constraints,
even if consumers smooth actual consumption. For this reason I focus on the estimate of
θ, which captures the diﬀerence between the two chains, given that they sell very similar
baskets of goods. The trend variables allow (diﬀerent) linear trends for the two retailers, and
season ﬁxed eﬀects capture the Christmas rush and other seasonal ﬂuctuations in purchasing
common to both chains. The reason for including a separate intercept and time trend for
Wal-Mart (ω and φ) is that Wal-Mart stores are, on average, larger than Target’s, and have
been growing — most notably due to the rapid expansion of the “Supercenter” format, which
includes a full line of groceries — at a faster rate.5
As an alternative speciﬁcation, I also estimate the model with time ﬁxed eﬀects,




+ φ · Trendt · Wal-Marti + εit (2)
5Basker, Klimek, and Van (2008) discuss the general trend of general-merchandisers adding product lines
to their stores. Basker and Noel (2008) provide background on Wal-Mart’s entry into the supermarket
industry.
6where Time is a vector of time dummies. The common trend variable, season dummies,
and the direct eﬀect of log disposable income cannot be estimated in this speciﬁcation, but
it allows us to estimate θ, Wal-Mart’s diﬀerential reaction to income ﬂuctuations, with fewer
functional form restrictions. (The coeﬃcient on Wal-Mart’s diﬀerential trend can still be
estimated.)
The results are shown in Table 1. Columns (1) and (2) show estimates of Equation
(1), with a common time trend and season ﬁxed eﬀects, as well as a Wal-Mart-speciﬁc time
trend; columns (3) and (4) show estimates of Equation (2), with a full set of time ﬁxed eﬀects
and a Wal-Mart-speciﬁc trend. In columns (1) and (2) I calculate the total income eﬀect
for Wal-Mart as the sum of the coeﬃcients on ln(Income) and ln(Income) · Wal-Mart,
and show the p-value from a t test for this sum equaling zero. These tests show that, with
conﬁdence levels around 95%, the eﬀect of an increase in personal disposable income on
Wal-Mart’s revenue is negative, whereas the eﬀect on Target’s revenue is positive and highly
signiﬁcant. The diﬀerence between these two income elasticities is large, around 1.3-1.4, and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% conﬁdence level.
Columns (1) and (3) use unadjusted log disposable income, while columns (2) and (4)
use adjustment income (the weighted average of disposable income in the current quarter
and the next quarter). The adjusted income is available for one fewer quarters than the
unadjusted income because it is a weighted average of two observations The coeﬃcients on
ln(Income) and the interaction term with Wal-Mart are slightly larger in absolute term with
the adjustment, consistent with the presence of measurement error in the original variable.





γs · Seasonst + εit (3)
where ∆ indicates the quarter-to-quarter change. The equation no longer includes time
7trends and the Wal-Mart variable is interpretable as the diﬀerential trend for Wal-Mart. (I
also estimate a variant of this equation with quarter ﬁxed eﬀects.) The results are shown
in Table 2: both income elasticities are larger in absolute terms, with Target’s positive and
Wal-Mart’s negative. The diﬀerence between them is estimated to be in the range of 1.7–2.7.
Despite the negative aggregate elasticity of demand for Wal-Mart’s products, these re-
sults imply that a decline in Wal-Mart’s revenues during economic booms is a rare event.
Holding income constant, Wal-Mart’s (real) revenue increases, on average, by about 5.2%
a year (summing the two coeﬃcients on the time trend in column (1) or (2)).6 An income
shock would have to be twice that size before the negative elasticity of demand dominated
the trend, or about 2.6% in a single quarter. Such a large positive quarter-to-quarter increase
in income is relatively rare; in the detrended and seasonally-adjusted income series I use here
it occurred three times over a 10-year period (in the second and fourth quarter of 1998 and
again in the ﬁrst quarter of 2006).
A possible simultaneity problem arises because income, the LHS variable of interest,
may be endogenous to Wal-Mart’s revenues. There is some evidence that Wal-Mart pays
lower wages than other retailers, so its expansion could lower income for retail workers.7 In
practice, this eﬀect, if present, is likely to be very small. Even given its size, total earning
of Wal-Mart employees are not a signiﬁcant share of personal disposable income.
In addition, the number of stores — which is used to calculate the LHS variable — may
be endogenous to income. In that case the LHS variable may move with income, but for the
wrong reasons. For example, if Wal-Mart opens more stores during good economic times,
an increase in the number of stores may come at the same time that consumers’ disposable
income rises, creating a spurious negative relationship between sales per store and income.
To address this problem I replace the LHS with total revenue and add the log of number
6The trend variable increases by 0.25 per quarter.
7See Dube, Eidlin, and Lester (2007); Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2005). Basker (2006) questions
the methodological assumptions underlying to reach these estimates.
8of stores as an explanatory variable, which I instrument with one-quarter lagged number of
stores. The regression equation is




γs · Seasonst + δ · Trendt + φ · Trendt · Wal-Marti + σ · ln(Storesit) + εit (4)
with ﬁrst-stage equation




e γs · Seasonst + e δ · Trendt + e φ · Trendt · Wal-Marti + e σ · ln(Storesi,t−1) + e εit
The results of this speciﬁcation are shown in Table 3. (The ﬁxed-eﬀect version of the model
is also shown.) The ﬁrst stage is uniformly strong, with F statistics for e σ well into the
double digits. Estimates of the income elasticity of Target’s revenues are around 0.9–1.2,
but estimates of the income elasticity of Wal-Mart’s revenue are virtually identical to those
in Table 1, though some statistical signiﬁcance is lost.
The RHS variable throughout this analysis has been revenue, not quantity of goods
purchased; log of revenue per store is really ln(P) + ln(Q). If (CPI-adjusted) prices at
Wal-Mart and Target were constant over the study period coeﬃcient estimates would be
unaﬀected, but if prices ﬂuctuate over time coeﬃcient estimates could be biased. Prices
at Wal-Mart have been falling relative to the CPI, so even the deﬂated revenues may be
inﬂated, but if the downward trend in prices is constant the two trend variables would be
suﬃcient to capture it. However, if Wal-Mart’s prices are counter-cyclical relative to the rest
of the economy — for example, if it lowers its markup when consumers’ disposable income is
low — the relationship between real revenue per store and income could reﬂect price changes
rather than quantity changes. Decomposing
dln(PQ)
dln(I) into an income elasticity of demand, an
income elasticity of price (cyclicality measure), and a price elasticity of demand, and solving
9for the income elasticity of demand
∂ ln(Q)
















Assuming demand for Wal-Mart’s products is elastic,
∂ ln(Q)
∂ ln(P) < −1, the estimated quantity
dln(PQ)




dln(I) < 0, and a lower bound otherwise. Since all
dollar amounts are CPI-deﬂated, the question is how Wal-Mart’s prices respond to changes
in aggregate income relative to the CPI. Appendix A reports regressions using auxiliary data
which suggest that Wal-Mart’s prices vary less with income than the rest of the economy,
implying that the estimate estimates reported above, −0.5, are an upper bound on the income
elasticity of demand for Wal-Mart’s products.
4 Conclusion
In this note, I estimate the income elasticity of revenue for Wal-Mart and Target over the
last ten years. Because some consumers are likely to view each discounter’s products as
normal while others view them as inferior, the aggregate relationship could go either way
and depends on the size of the two groups as well as on the magnitude of their elasticities
of demand (positive and negative). I ﬁnd that demand for Wal-Mart’s products exhibits
a negative income elasticity and Target’s demand exhibits a positive income elasticity. An
upper bound on the income elasticity of demand for Wal-Mart’s products is −0.5, with more
realistic (still conservative) values closer to −0.7. For the average consumer, then, it appears
that shopping at Target is perfectly normal, but shopping at Wal-Mart is not.
10A Price vs. Revenue Elasticities
To assess the relative cyclicality of Wal-Mart’s prices I use auxiliary data from the American
Chamber of Commerce Research Association (ACCRA). The data include prices at both
Wal-Mart Supercenters and a wide variety of other grocery stores and supermarkets for 24
products in 175 cities in 40 states at the beginning of the third quarter of each year for
2001–2004.8 Although the product set is limited to groceries, the results are suggestive for
other products sold by Wal-Mart. Because the time-series data comprise only four data
points a regression of the sort in Equation (1) using average prices is not informative, but we
can use variation in income across states and over time to estimate how Wal-Mart’s prices
vary relative to other stores’ prices as state-level incomes change.
For each product, state, and year, I calculate the average log (real) price at Wal-Mart and
at other grocery stores and use the state’s real per-capita income from the BEA to estimate
Wal-Mart’s relative price sensitivity to income variations. Letting p index products, g index
stores (Wal-Mart or non-Wal-Mart), s index state and t index year, I estimate:




γp · Productp +
X
s
ψs · States +
2004 X
t=2001
δtTimet + εpgst (6)
where Product is a set of product ﬁxed eﬀects, State is a set of state ﬁxed eﬀects, Time
are time ﬁxed eﬀects, and Wal-Mart is a Wal-Mart ﬁxed eﬀect; ln(Income) is log of
real per-capita personal income by state and quarter.9 The time ﬁxed eﬀects capture any
across-the-board price changes from year to year due to aggregate inﬂation. The coeﬃcient
β captures the degree to which overall prices move with income, whereas θ captures the
diﬀerential movement of Wal-Mart’s prices, a proxy for
dln(P)
dln(I) in Equation (5). Neither
8See Basker and Noel (2008) for details about the data.
9Unlike in the earlier regressions, it is not disposable income because these ﬁgures are not available at
the state level.
11coeﬃcient is statistically diﬀerent from zero but the point estimate of θ is around −0.11,
suggesting that, if anything, Wal-Mart’s prices are countercyclical relative to the rest of the
economy.10
To account for the possibility that Wal-Mart’s prices vary less with state-level conditions
because of uniform pricing, I also estimate Equation (6) using only prices from Wal-Mart and
the “Big Three” supermarket chains (Albertson’s, Kroger, and Safeway) which had similar
national markets.11 Coeﬃcient estimates are virtually unchanged.
Taking this point estimate at face value we can calculate the income elasticity of demand
at Wal-Mart from Equation (5). To be conservative, I assume that the price elasticity of
demand at Wal-Mart is −3 and that
dln(PQ)
dln(I) = −0.5 (based on the results in Tables 1 and
3).12 In that case the income elasticity of demand for Wal-Mart’s wares is approximately
−0.72. Thus, if personal incomes fall by 2%, this would cause revenues at each of Wal-Mart’s
stores to increase, on average, by 1.44%.
10Results are not sensitive to adding interactions of Wal-Mart with each product ﬁxed eﬀect, allowing
product ﬁxed eﬀects to diﬀer by year, and adding state-speciﬁc trends.
11Uniform pricing could be motivated by managerial “menu costs” involved in price setting (see, e.g.,
Levy, Bergen, Dutta, and Venable, 1997), or by strategic considerations as a device to “soften” competition
in contested markets (see Dobson and Waterson, 2005, for a model of this phenomenon).
12Basker and Van (2008) calibrate the aggregate price elasticity of demand at Wal-Mart to be approx-
imately −3.2. This number is in keeping with estimated price elasticities for various items at Dominick’s
Finer Foods grocery stores reported by Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003). Chiou (2005) estimates the
price elasticity of demand for DVDs at Wal-Mart to be about −2.
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Figure 1. Shopping Frequency at Wal-Mart and Target by Income
Table 1. Coeﬃcient Estimates, Equations (1) and (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wal-Mart 37.1501*** 40.0570*** 37.1501*** 40.0570***
(5.7646) (6.7904) (7.1184) (8.1598)
ln(Income) 0.8153*** 0.9088***
(0.2506) (0.2575)
ln(Income)· Wal-Mart -1.3240*** -1.4289*** -1.3240*** -1.4289***
(0.2072) (0.2442) (0.2559) (0.2935)
Time Trend 0.0092** 0.0069
(0.0044) (0.0046)
Trend · Wal-Mart 0.0420*** 0.0464*** 0.0420*** 0.0464***
(0.0043) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0057)
Time Dummies N N Y Y
Season Dummies Y Y N N
Income Adjusted N Y N Y
Total Income Eﬀect for Wal-Mart -0.5087** -0.5200*
p-value 0.0424 0.0539
Observations 78 76 78 76
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
15Table 2. Coeﬃcient Estimates, Equation (3)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wal-Mart 0.0136 0.0212** 0.0136 0.0212**
(0.0085) (0.0081) (0.0106) (0.0099)
∆ln(Income) 1.0644*** 1.7534***
(0.2614) (0.3684)
∆ln(Income)· Wal-Mart -1.7227*** -2.7314*** -1.7227*** -2.7314***
(0.1155) (0.2123) (0.1407) (0.2653)
Time Dummies N N Y Y
Season Dummies Y Y N N
Income Adjusted N Y N Y
Total Income Eﬀect for Wal-Mart -0.6583** -0.9780**
p-value 0.0206 0.0183
Observations 78 76 78 76
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
Table 3. Coeﬃcient Estimates, Equation (4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Stores) 1.6929 2.4386* 2.0044 2.9119
(1.0234) (1.3632) (1.5598) (1.9584)
Wal-Mart 39.8258*** 44.8324*** 40.6323*** 46.0322***
(6.5808) (7.9153) (8.1812) (10.4069)
ln(Income) 0.9586*** 1.1981***
(0.2697) (0.3488)
ln(Income)· Wal-Mart -1.4480*** -1.6587*** -1.4897*** -1.7210***
(0.2547) (0.3050) (0.3204 (0.4043)
Time Trend -0.0423 -0.1003
(0.0748) (0.1007)
Trend · Wal-Mart 0.0628** 0.0904** 0.0726 0.1049*
(0.0310) (0.0416) (0.0471) (0.0595)
Time Dummies N N Y Y
Season Dummies Y Y N N
Income Adjusted N Y N Y
Total Income Eﬀect for Wal-Mart -0.4849* -0.4606
p-value 0.0638 0.1596
First-Stage F Statistic 66.6761 32.4257 49.8181 19.0429
Observations 77 75 77 75
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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